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SUMMARY OF THE CASE
The original plaintiffs were seven Missouri citizens, including Lieutenant
Governor Peter Kinder, who appears in his personal rather than his official capacity. 
Plaintiffs filed a nine-count amended complaint that challenged various provisions
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) on
different grounds.  The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of
standing.
Two of the plaintiffs, Kinder and Samantha Hill, have appealed.  They have
abandoned many of their claims, but they challenge on appeal the minimum coverage
provision of the Affordable Care Act and contend that they have standing to do so. 
When the provision takes effect in 2014, it will require that non-exempted individuals
maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a tax penalty.  The district court
held that Hill’s allegations do not establish that the provision is causing or will cause
her injury.  The court did not consider Kinder’s belated attempt to join Hill’s
challenge to the minimum coverage provision because Kinder did not include such
a claim in the amended complaint.
Appellants have briefed standing and the merits and requested 30 minutes of
oral argument time.  Because the standing issue is controlling, the government
respectfully submits that 15 minutes is sufficient.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The
district court dismissed the case for lack of standing on April 26, 2011.  Plaintiffs
filed a timely notice of appeal on April 29, 2011.  This Court has appellate
jurisdiction  under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.  Whether the district court correctly dismissed this pre-enforcement
challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision for lack of
standing.
New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3366340 (3d Cir.
August 3, 2011)
Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009)
2.  Assuming standing, whether the minimum coverage provision is a valid
exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
Thomas More Law Center, et al. v. Obama, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 2556039 (6th
Cir. June 29, 2011)
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
3.  Assuming standing, whether Congress’s taxing power provides independent
authority for the minimum coverage provision.
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950)
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 17      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.  The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive reform of our national health
care system.  The Act seeks to ameliorate the crisis in the interstate market for health
care services, which accounts for more than 17% of the nation’s gross domestic
product.  Although insurance is the customary means of payment for health care
services in the United States, millions of people do not have insurance.  They
nonetheless consume health care services for which they do not pay, shifting billions
of dollars of health care costs to other participants in the health care market.  The
result is higher premiums that, in turn, make insurance unaffordable to even greater
numbers of people.  At the same time, insurance companies use restrictive
underwriting practices to deny coverage to millions across the nation who have pre-
existing medical conditions.
The Affordable Care Act addresses these national problems through a series
of measures that will make affordable health care coverage widely available, protect
consumers from restrictive insurance industry underwriting practices, and reduce the
amount of care to people without insurance that is uncompensated and that increases
the premiums of insured consumers.
2.  The original plaintiffs in this suit were seven Missouri citizens, including
Lieutenant Governor Kinder.  Kinder initially purported to appear in his official
2
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capacity, but the Missouri Attorney General objected, and Kinder amended the
complaint to appear in his personal capacity instead.  Add. 3-4.  The nine-count
amended complaint challenged various provisions of the Affordable Care Act on
different grounds, many of which are abandoned on appeal.
On appeal, Kinder and Samantha Hill seek to challenge the Act’s minimum
coverage provision.  When that provision takes effect in 2014, it will require that non-
exempted individuals maintain a minimum level of insurance or pay a tax penalty. 
The district court held that Hill lacks standing to challenge this provision because she
failed to show that it is causing or will cause her injury.  Add. 9-13.  The court did not
consider Kinder’s standing because he failed to challenge the provision in the
amended complaint.  Add. 11.  The court thus did not reach the merits of plaintiffs’
argument that the minimum coverage provision exceeds Congress’s Article I powers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Background
In responding to the crisis in the health care market, Congress confronted a
market different from any other.  Although participation in the health care market is
virtually universal, the particular nature of an individual’s need for health care is
unpredictable.  The cost of health care is likewise unpredictable and can easily exceed
3
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the financial means of all but the wealthiest individuals.  Insurance is thus the
customary means by which people pay for health care services.  
Millions of people do not have insurance, however, and health care providers
— unlike vendors in other markets — are often legally required to provide services
in times of need without regard to the consumer’s ability to pay.  As a result, people
without insurance collectively shift to other participants in the health care market
both the ongoing financial risk that they, as uninsured, will incur costs beyond their
ability to pay, and the tens of billions of dollars of actual medical costs each year that
are consumed by the uninsured without payment, thereby raising the premiums of
insured consumers.
A. Participation in the health care services market is virtually
universal, but the nature and cost of needed medical services are
highly unpredictable.
Nearly everyone participates in the health care services market, regardless of
whether they have insurance.  In 2008 alone, U.S. hospitals reported more than 2.1
million hospitalizations of the uninsured.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
(“HHS”), ASPE Research Brief, The Value of Health Insurance: Few of the
Uninsured Have Adequate Resources To Pay Potential Hospital Bills (“ASPE
Research Br.”), at 5 (May 2011).  In 2009, almost 60% of Americans under age 65
who were “uninsured more than 12 months” had at least one visit with a doctor or to
4
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an emergency room; approximately 80% of those who were “uninsured for any period
up to 12 months” did so.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”),
Health, United States, 2010, table 79 (2011).  One out of five uninsured individuals
visits the emergency room each year.  Id. table 89; CDC, Summary Health Statistics
for U.S. Children: National Health Interview Survey, 2010, table 16 (2011).
Although the risk of illness or injury is ever-present, the timing of an
individual’s need for expensive medical care is unpredictable.  “Most medical
expenses for people under 65” result “from the ‘bolt-from-the-blue’ event of an
accident, a stroke, or a complication of pregnancy that we know will happen on
average but whose victim we cannot (and they cannot) predict well in advance.” 
Expanding Consumer Choice and Addressing “Adverse Selection” Concerns in
Health Insurance, Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm. 32 (2004) (Prof. Pauly). 
“[E]ven the best risk adjustment systems used to predict medical spending explain
only 25 to 35 percent of the variation in the costs different individuals incur; the vast
bulk of spending needs cannot be forecast in advance.”  Amicus Br. of Economic
Scholars, Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir.) (“Economic
Scholars Br.”), at 10-11 (citing Winkelman & Mehmud, Society of Actuaries, A
Comparative Analysis of Claims-Based Tools for Health Risk Assessment, Apr.
2007).
5
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Costs can mount rapidly for even the most common medical procedures.  For
example, approximately one in three babies in the U.S. is born by Cesarean delivery,
the cost of which averages more than $13,000.  See National Vital Statistics Reports,
Births: Preliminary Data for 2009 (Dec. 2010); International Federation of Health
Plans, 2010 Comparative Price Report: Medical and Hospital Fees by Country (“IFHP
Rep.”), at 12.  The average bill for a single hospital stay for an uninsured person is
$22,200.  ASPE Research Br. 8.  The average cost of bypass surgery is nearly
$60,000; of an appendectomy, $13,000; of an angioplasty, $29,000.  IFHP Rep., at
16, 14, 17.  An MRI scan alone costs $1,000 on average.  Id. at 8.  See also, e.g.,
Meropol & Schulman, Cost of Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J. Clin.
Oncol. 180, 182 (2007) (one year of drug treatment for metastatic colorectal cancer
can cost $150,000-$200,000).
The potential for financially ruinous burdens is plain, and 62% of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G). 
The risk we all confront can be expressed statistically for large populations, but what
actually will happen to any given individual in a particular time period — the
“frequency, timing and magnitude” of an individual’s demand for health care services
— is largely unknowable.  Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100
6
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Q.J. Med. 53, 54-55 (2007); see Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941, 948-49 (1963).  
B. Private or governmental insurance is the customary means by which
people pay for health care services, and the federal government’s
involvement in health care financing is pervasive.
Insurance, either private or governmental, is the customary means by which
people manage this risk and pay for health care in the United States.  In 2009,
payments by private insurers constituted 32% of national health care spending.  CMS,
2009 National Health Expenditure Data, table 3 (2011).  Payments by government
programs constituted more than 43% of health care spending that year.  Id., tables 5
& 11.  Consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses — including deductibles, copayments, and
payments for uncovered services — accounted for only 12% of national health care
spending in 2009.  Id., table 3.
The federal government’s involvement in health care financing is pervasive. 
Virtually all Americans aged 65 or older are insured through the federal Medicare
program.  The Uninsured: A Primer, Kaiser Family Foundation, at 1 (Dec. 2010). 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program have covered 20% of the non-
elderly population by covering categories of low-income individuals.  Id. at 3.  In
2010, federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid was more than $790 billion, with
billions more spent on other health care programs.  Congressional Budget Office
7
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(“CBO”), The Long-Term Budget Outlook, at 37-39 (2011).  These figures do not
include the federal government’s longstanding use of tax incentives to finance health
care costs.  CBO, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Proposals (“CBO, Key
Issues”), at 30 (2008).
C. As a class, people who attempt to pay for health care services
through means other than insurance shift significant costs to other
participants in the interstate health care market.
An estimated 50 million people (18.8% of the non-elderly population) lacked
health insurance in 2009.  Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009 (“Census Rep.”), at 23 table 8.  As
discussed above (pp. 4-5, supra), these people actively participate in the interstate
health care market, consuming more than $100 billion of health care services
annually.  Families USA, Hidden Health Tax: Americans Pay a Premium, at 2 (2009)
($116 billion in 2008).
In the health care market, unlike in other markets, people receive expensive
services in times of need without regard to their ability to pay.  For decades, state and
federal laws have required emergency rooms to stabilize patients who arrive with an
emergency condition, and common-law and ethical duties restrict a physician’s ability
to terminate a patient-physician relationship.   See pp. 40-42, infra.  As a result,
8
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people without insurance “receive treatments from traditional providers for which
they either do not pay or pay very little.”  CBO, Key Issues, at 13.
Congress found that, in 2008, the cost of uncompensated health care for the
uninsured — i.e., care received by uninsured patients but not paid for by them or by
a third party on their behalf — was $43 billion.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see
also Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2, 6.  Congress found that health care
providers pass on a significant portion of these costs “to private insurers, which pass
on the cost to families,” increasing the average premium for insured families by “over
$1,000 a year.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see also Families USA, Hidden Health
Tax, at 2, 6.
D. Before the Affordable Care Act, the percentage of people with
private health insurance steadily decreased.
In 2009, the percentage of the non-elderly population with private health
insurance coverage (64.2%) was significantly lower than it had been in 2000 (73.4%),
meaning that millions more lacked insurance.  Holahan, The 2007-09 Recession and
Health Insurance Coverage, 30 Health Affairs 145, 148 (2011).  The percentage
covered by employment-based plans dropped from 68.3% in 2000 to 59% in 2009. 
Ibid.
9
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People who attempt to purchase health insurance in the individual insurance
market face significant obstacles.  Insurers scrutinize an applicant’s medical condition
and history to determine eligibility and premiums, a process known as “medical
underwriting.”  CBO, Key Issues, at 8, 80.  A recent national survey estimated that
9 million non-elderly adults — 35% of those who tried to purchase health insurance
in the individual insurance market in the previous three years — were denied
coverage, charged a higher rate, or offered limited coverage because of a pre-existing
condition.  Help on the Horizon, Findings from the Commonwealth Fund Biennial
Health Insurance Survey of 2010 (“Help on the Horizon”), at xi (2011). 
Medical underwriting is expensive, and insurers pass on that expense through
increased premiums in the individual market.  Administrative costs for private health
insurance, including underwriting costs, totaled $90 billion in 2006 — 26% to 30%
of the cost of the insurance premiums charged in the individual and small group
markets.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
Given the cost of insurance policies and restrictions on coverage, only 20% of
Americans who lack employer insurance, government insurance, or other coverage
options purchase a policy in the individual market.  CBO, Key Issues, at 9.  The
remaining 80% are uninsured.  Ibid.
10
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II.  The Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act addresses problems in the national health care system
that states individually have proven unable to solve effectively.  Through
comprehensive reforms, the Act seeks to make health care coverage widely available
and affordable, protect consumers from adverse underwriting practices, and reduce
the uncompensated care that shifts costs to other participants in the interstate health
care market and thereby increases premiums for insured consumers.
First, the Act builds upon the existing nationwide system of employer-based
health insurance, the principal private mechanism for health care financing.  Congress
established tax incentives for small businesses to purchase health insurance for their
employees, 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R, and prescribed tax penalties under certain
circumstances for large employers that do not offer full-time employees adequate
coverage, id. § 4980H.
Second, the Act provides for the creation of health insurance exchanges to
allow individuals, families, and small businesses to aggregate their buying power to
obtain prices competitive with those of large-employer group plans.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18031.
Third, the Act offers tax credits to assist households with incomes from 133%
to 400% of the federal poverty line in purchasing insurance through the exchanges. 
11
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26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (b).   Congress also authorized federal payments to help cover1
out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., co-payments or deductibles) for eligible individuals
who obtain coverage through an exchange.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18071.  In addition,
Congress expanded eligibility for Medicaid to cover individuals with incomes up to
133% of the federal poverty line.  Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
Fourth, the Act regulates insurers to prohibit industry practices that have
prevented people from obtaining and maintaining health insurance.  Among other
things, the Act bars insurers from refusing coverage because of pre-existing medical
conditions and from charging higher premiums based on a person’s medical history. 
See, e.g., id. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-4(a). 
Fifth, the Act’s minimum coverage provision requires that non-exempted
individuals maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a tax penalty.  26
U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  The requirement may be satisfied through enrollment in an
employer-sponsored plan; an individual market plan, including one offered through
a health insurance exchange; a grandfathered plan; government-sponsored programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid, or TRICARE; or similar coverage as recognized by the
Secretary of HHS in coordination with the Treasury Secretary.  Id. § 5000A(f)(1). 
 Except in Alaska and Hawaii, the federal poverty line in 2011 is $10,890 for1
one person and $22,350 for a family of four.  HHS Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg.
3637-02 (Jan. 20, 2011). 
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Congress exempted certain groups from the minimum coverage requirement, id.
§ 5000A(d), and made the tax penalty inapplicable to individuals whose household
income is too low to require them to file a federal income tax return; whose premium
payments would exceed 8% of household income; or who establish (under standards
set by the HHS Secretary) that they have suffered a hardship with respect to the
capability to obtain coverage.  Id. § 5000A(e).
The CBO has projected that, by 2019, the Act will reduce the number of non-
elderly people without insurance by about 33 million.  Letter from CBO Director
Douglas Elmendorf to House Speaker John Boehner, table 3 (Feb. 18, 2011).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act as a whole, and the minimum coverage provision in
particular, regulate the way consumers pay for services in the interstate health care
market.  The Act reflects the considered effort of the elected branches of government
to stem a crisis in the health care market.
I.  The district court correctly dismissed this challenge to the minimum
coverage provision for lack of standing.  This suit is a pre-enforcement challenge to
the minimum coverage provision, which does not take effect until 2014. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs must show that the provision is having a “direct and
immediate” impact on their conduct.  Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976,
13
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984 (8th Cir. 2009).  In other Affordable Care Act cases, plaintiffs have made such
a showing by representing that they have changed their spending practices in specific
ways in order to have funds available to pay for insurance when the minimum
coverage provision takes effect.  See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, __
F.3d __, 2011 WL 2556039, *3 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011).  Plaintiff Hill failed to make
such a showing, nor did she allege facts showing that she will be subject to a tax
penalty in 2014 if she fails to obtain minimum coverage.  Accordingly, the district
court correctly held that Hill lacks standing.  The court properly declined to consider
plaintiff Kinder’s standing because he failed to challenge the minimum coverage
provision in the amended complaint.  In any event, Kinder admits that he has health
insurance and fails to show any actual or imminent injury attributable to the
provision.
II.  If the Court reaches the merits, it should uphold the minimum coverage
provision as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power for the reasons stated in
the Sixth Circuit’s Thomas More decision.  
A.  The minimum coverage provision is a quintessential exercise of the
commerce power, which allows Congress to regulate not only interstate commerce
but also economic conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.  Congress
found that the minimum coverage provision regulates economic activity — how
14
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participants in the health care market pay for their services — that substantially
affects interstate commerce.  The regulation furthers two principal economic goals. 
First, it prevents people from shifting the financial risks and actual costs of their
health care to other participants in the interstate health care market.  Second, it is key
to the viability of the Act’s regulatory provisions barring insurers from relying on
medical conditions or history to deny coverage or set premiums.
Fundamental features of the health care market are undisputed.  Health care
providers, suppliers, and insurers operate interstate.  Virtually all Americans
participate in the health care market, and face the risk of unpredictable medical needs
that may require services easily exceeding the ability to pay.  Under state and federal
law, people are entitled to receive costly medical treatment in times of need even if
they cannot pay.  Congress found that people who endeavor to pay for health care
without insurance often fail to do so, and, as a class, do not pay for tens of billions of
dollars of costs each year.
The federal government, along with state governments, shoulders some of these
costs.  Health care providers pass much of the remainder on to private insurers,
causing higher premiums for the insured.  Rising premiums mean more people cannot
afford insurance, which contributes to the decline in the privately insured population. 
15
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Completing the cycle, the growing number of uninsured persons further inflates
insurance premiums for others.
The Affordable Care Act breaks this cycle by requiring participants in the
health care market to maintain a minimum level of insurance to meet their health care
costs.  The Act also restricts the underwriting practices of the insurance industry that
have deprived many Americans of affordable insurance because of pre-existing
medical conditions.  The Act thus makes people legally insurable regardless of illness
or injury and protects against higher premiums based on medical condition or history. 
The experience of state insurance regulators demonstrated that this system of
guaranteed issue and community rating would be unworkable without a minimum
coverage provision that prevents health care consumers from exploiting the new
guarantees by delaying their purchase of insurance until their medical costs outstrip
the insurance premiums.
In short, Congress had far more than a rational basis for choosing the minimum
coverage provision as a means of regulating the way individuals finance health care
services, of preventing consumers from shifting costs to other market participants,
and of effectuating the Act’s regulatory requirements of guaranteed issue and
community rating.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17, 22 (2005).
16
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B.  The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the premise of plaintiffs’ argument,
which is that the minimum coverage provision regulates “inactivity.”  People without
insurance are not “inactive”; they actively participate in the market for health care
services.  Health insurance is a means to pay for such services; health insurance is not
obtained for its own sake.  The minimum coverage provision regulates the way people
pay for health care services — activity that is “commercial and economic in nature”
and that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(A), (F).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress can regulate the way people pay for
services at the time that they obtain medical care.  Plaintiffs take issue only with the
timing of the minimum coverage requirement, asserting that it cannot be imposed
until medical care is actually consumed.  Pl. Br. 59.  
This contention is premised on a deep misunderstanding of the nature of
insurance and its role in the health care services market.  Health insurance, by its
nature, must be obtained before medical care is actually needed.  Common sense,
experience, and economic analysis show that a “health insurance market could never
survive or even form if people could buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.” 
47 Million and Counting, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 52
(2008) (Prof. Hall).  Moreover, it was clearly appropriate under the Necessary and
17
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 33      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
Proper Clause for Congress to take into account the societal judgment — long
reflected in state law, as well as the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act (“EMTALA”) — that it would be unconscionable to adopt an approach that
would require providers to deny care in times of need because a person lacks
insurance.
Even assuming, however, that plaintiffs could identify a preferable regulatory
alternative, that would not support invalidation of the statute that Congress enacted. 
The Supreme Court has long stressed the deference owed to Congress’s choice of
means to accomplish its legitimate regulatory objectives.  That deference reflects the
constitutional authority and institutional capacity of the political branches to make
such operational choices.  “The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen
are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce
power.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted).  That standard echoes the principles set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 421 (1819), and reaffirmed countless times since: “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
18
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The end that Congress addressed in the minimum coverage provision is
undoubtedly a proper regulatory objective under the Commerce Clause.  People who
forgo insurance and attempt to “self-insure” shift substantial risks and costs to others
in the health care market.  And the means that Congress selected — requiring people
who can afford insurance to maintain a minimum level of coverage to meet their
health care needs — is adapted to the health care market, in which insurance is
already the customary means of payment.  Moreover, the minimum coverage
provision forms an essential part of the Act’s regulation of insurers that guarantees
that individuals like plaintiffs will be able to obtain insurance even if they become
injured or sick — insurance regulation that is indisputably legitimate under the
Commerce Clause.
III.  Congress’s taxing power provides independent authority for the minimum
coverage provision.  The provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide that
a non-exempted individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of health insurance
must pay a tax penalty.  The amount is calculated as a percentage of household
income, above a flat dollar amount and subject to a cap.  Like the federal income tax,
it will be reported on the individual’s tax return for the taxable year, and assessed and
collected in the same general manner as certain other federal tax penalties.  The
19
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minimum coverage provision thus operates as a tax, and it is projected to raise
billions of dollars in revenue each year.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the validity of this provision under the taxing
power does not turn on whether the assessment is labeled a “tax.”  The Affordable
Care Act uses terms like “tax” and “assessable payment” interchangeably, and the
Constitution itself uses various terms to describe the power of taxation.  In “passing
on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only with its practical
operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be
applied to it.”  Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941).  Because
the minimum coverage provision operates as a tax and is projected to raise revenue,
it is a valid exercise of the taxing power.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order of dismissal is subject to de novo review in this Court. 
ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Correctly Dismissed This Pre-Enforcement 
Challenge on Standing Grounds. 
The district court correctly dismissed this pre-enforcement challenge to the
minimum coverage provision for lack of standing.  “For purposes of standing, a
plaintiff’s injury must consist of ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
20
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hypothetical.’”  Young America Corp. v. Affiliated Computer Srvs., Inc., 424 F.3d
840, 843 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).  “Pre-enforcement facial challenges [to a statute] may be brought ... in certain
circumstances.”  Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 984 (8th Cir. 2009). 
“Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the facial validity of a regulation
notwithstanding the pre-enforcement nature of a lawsuit, where the impact of the
regulation is direct and immediate and they allege an actual, well-founded fear that
the law will be enforced against them.”  Ibid.
In other Affordable Care Act cases, courts have found that individuals have
established such a direct and immediate impact by alleging that they must take action
now in order to be in a position to obtain insurance in 2014.  For example, in Thomas
More, the Sixth Circuit relied on declarations showing that “the impending
requirement to buy medical insurance on the private market has changed [the
plaintiffs’] present spending and saving habits.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039,
*3.  Plaintiff John Ceci represented that he has delayed car repairs and computer
upgrades for his office in order to have funds available for insurance in 2014.  See
No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.) (Ceci Decl. ¶¶ 7-8) (filed 5/30/11).  Similarly, plaintiff Steven
Hyder represented that he and his wife “have to forego making home and car repairs”
21
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to have funds available for insurance in 2014.  See No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.) (Hyder
Decl. ¶¶ 7-8) (filed 5/30/11).2
By contrast, in New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, __ F.3d __, 2011
WL 3366340 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 20110), the Third Circuit held that an individual lacked
standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because he failed to allege
facts showing present or imminent future injury.  There were “no facts alleged to
indicate that [the plaintiff] is in any way presently impacted by the Act or the
mandate.”  Id. at *4.  The Third Circuit thus contrasted Thomas More and other cases
“in which the plaintiffs alleged or demonstrated that they were experiencing some
current financial harm or pressure arising out of the individual mandate’s looming
enforcement in 2014.”  Ibid.  In addition, the Third Circuit explained that the plaintiff
had failed to allege facts establishing “a ‘realistic danger’ that [he] would be harmed
 See also, e.g., Florida v. HHS, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, *7-*82
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (plaintiff represented that she “must now investigate” whether “she
will have to lay off employees, close her business, and seek employment that provides
qualifying health insurance as a benefit”), appeals pending, Nos. 11-11021 &
11-11067 (11th Cir.); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 764
F. Supp. 2d 684, 690-92 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (plaintiffs represented that they would have
to forgo a five-year contract on a new car); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d. 16, 24-
26 (D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiff alleged that she must forgo college savings), appeal
pending sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.); Liberty Univ., Inc.
v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624 (W.D. Va. 2010) (plaintiffs alleged that they
“must incur the preparation costs in the near term”), appeal pending, No. 10-2347
(4th Cir.).
22
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 38      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
by the individual mandate” when it takes effect, noting his failure to address potential
exemptions.  Ibid.3
Here, as in New Jersey Physicians, the amended complaint fails to establish
actual or imminent injury.  The amended complaint does not allege that Hill is
experiencing current financial pressure and taking actions now in order to save funds
to pay for insurance in 2014.  Even Hill’s affidavit includes only vague statements
declaring that Hill generally plans for future financial obligations by forgoing
spending today.  JA 197.  That affidavit has none of the specificity of the Thomas
More declarations and does not establish the “direct and immediate” impact required
for a pre-enforcement challenge.  Gray, 567 F.3d at 984.
Nor has Hill shown a realistic danger of injury in 2014.  The amended
complaint states that, “[s]hould Samantha Hill not purchase a federally-mandated
health insurance policy, PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her.”  JA 120
¶ 153; JA 197 ¶ 18 (affidavit) (similar).  Hill does not deny that she will obtain
minimum coverage, however.  Instead, she predicts, based on speculative assumptions
 District courts likewise have dismissed challenges to the minimum coverage3
provision where individuals failed to establish standing.  See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 753
F. Supp. 2d at 621-22 & nn. 6-7; Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-1033, 2010 WL
3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-56374 (9th Cir.).
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about relative costs and benefits of different policies, that she will want a policy in
several years that does not meet minimum standards.  JA 116 ¶ 138; JA 196 ¶ 14.
These predictions do not take into account the premium tax credits that will be
available under the Affordable Care Act.  They do not take in account the fact that
Hill’s medical needs may change over the next several years.  They do not take into
account the possibility of employer-provided insurance.   See Thomas More, Pl. Letter
of May 25, 2011, at 2 (admitting that, while the case was pending, plaintiff DeMars
obtained employer-provided insurance at a fraction of the cost she had estimated for
a policy in the individual market).  Indeed, unlike the Thomas More plaintiffs, Hill
provided no information regarding her employment.  Compare Ceci Decl. ¶ 3 (“I am
a lawyer and a solo practitioner.  Consequently, I do not have employer-provided
healthcare coverage.”); Hyder Decl. ¶ 3 (same).  Moreover, Hill’s predictions about
the type of policy she may want in several years assume that such policies would be
available on the individual market in Missouri.  The amended complaint, however,
states that  Missouri has “extensive statutes regulating health insurance” that require
coverage of specified services.  JA 105 ¶ 93; see also, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.1232
(requiring coverage of prosthetic devices and services); id. § 376.1215
(immunizations for children under 5); id. § 376.1220 (newborn hearing screening and
aid); id. § 376.1200 (certain breast cancer treatments); Bunce and Wieske, Council
24
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for Affordable Health Insurance, Health Insurance Mandates in the States 2009
(listing 41 health insurance mandates in Missouri).
Like the plaintiffs found not to have standing in New Jersey Physicians, Hill
also failed to show that she would be subject to a tax penalty if she does not have
minimum coverage in 2014.  The Third Circuit correctly noted that Congress made
the tax penalty inapplicable to individuals whose household income is too low to
require them to file a federal income tax return, whose premium payments would
exceed 8% of household income, or who establish (under standards set by HHS) that
the minimum coverage requirement would impose a hardship.  New Jersey
Physicians, 2011 WL 3366340, *1, *4 (citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)).  Neither the
amended complaint nor Hill’s affidavit alleged facts relevant to those exemptions.  
“Even at the motion to dismiss stage, ... ‘[i]t is a long-settled principle that
standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings but
rather must affirmatively appear in the record.’”  Id. at *3 (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).  Thus, the district court correctly held that
Hill lacks standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision.4
 Hill’s invocation of the “Missouri Health Care Freedom Act,” Pl. Br. 29-31.4
adds nothing to her standing argument.
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The district court properly declined to consider Kinder’s standing because he
did not challenge the minimum coverage provision in the amended complaint. 
Add. 11.  In any event, Kinder admits that he has health insurance provided by the
State of Missouri, JA 459-60, and thus cannot show that the minimum coverage
provision is having a “direct and immediate” impact on his conduct.  Gray, 567 F.3d
at 984.  Although Kinder states that his current insurance will end with his term as
Lieutenant Governor, he does not claim that he will forgo insurance at that time or
show that he would be subject to a tax penalty.  Thus, Kinder also lacks standing to
challenge the minimum coverage provision.
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise   
of Congress’s Commerce Power.
If the Court were to reach the merits, it should uphold the minimum coverage
provision under the commerce power for reasons recently set out by the Sixth Circuit
in Thomas More.  The Constitution grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce
... among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper” to the execution of that power, id. cl. 18.  These
grants of authority allow Congress to regulate not only interstate commerce but also
other economic conduct that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545
U.S. at 16-17.  In assessing such substantial effects, Congress’s focus is necessarily
broad.  Congress may consider the aggregate effect of a particular category of
26
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conduct, and need not predict case by case whether and to what extent particular
individuals in the class will contribute to those aggregate effects.  Id. at 22.
In reviewing the validity of Commerce Clause legislation, a court’s task “is a
modest one.”  Ibid.  The court “need not determine” whether the regulated conduct,
“taken in the aggregate, substantially affect[s] interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Ibid.  A court is similarly
deferential in reviewing the means Congress chose to achieve legitimate ends.  “[T]he
Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by
broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the
authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956
(2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).  This deference reflects separation-
of-powers principles and Congress’s superior capacity to make empirical and
operational judgments.  It “has special significance in cases, like this one, involving
congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity.” 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997).
Congress’s findings and the legislative record leave no doubt that the minimum
coverage provision — which regulates how people pay for services in the interstate
health care market — is a valid exercise of the commerce power under the standards
established by the Supreme Court.  The provision “regulates activity that is
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commercial and economic in nature,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A), and that
substantially affects interstate commerce.  First, Congress found that people who
endeavor to pay for health care through means other than insurance shift billions of
dollars of costs annually to other participants in the interstate health care market.  Id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F).  Second, Congress found that the minimum coverage provision is
key to the viability of the Act’s insurance reforms that make individuals insurable at
non-discriminatory rates regardless of illness or injury.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I), (J).
A. The minimum coverage provision regulates economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.
1.  Congress enacted the minimum coverage provision as part of a broad
scheme to regulate the payment for health care services.  In findings set out in the
statute, Congress explained that the minimum coverage provision “regulates activity
that is commercial and economic in nature,” including “how and when health care is
paid for.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).
Congress identified the substantial burden on interstate commerce that it was
seeking to alleviate.  Congress found that people who “forego health insurance
coverage and attempt to self-insure” often fail to pay for the medical services that
they consume.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(A), (F).  Congress found that “[t]he cost of
providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.”  Id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F).  Congress also made findings about how these uncompensated costs
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affect the interstate health care market — costs are passed on from providers “to
private insurers, which pass on the cost to families.”  Ibid.  Congress determined that
this cost-shifting inflates family health insurance premiums “by on average over
$1,000 a year.”  Ibid.; see also Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2, 6.  In
California, for example, uncompensated care for the uninsured accounts for an
estimated 10% of insurance premiums.  S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 2 (2009).
In acting to reduce this cost-shifting, Congress dealt with the reality that all
people are at risk of injury and illness, and even those without insurance actively
participate in the market for health care services.  See p. 5, supra.  As a class, people
without insurance pay only 37% of their health care costs out of pocket.  Families
USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 6.  Third parties, including government programs that
provide funding to offset the costs of care for the uninsured, pay for another 26% of
the costs of care for the uninsured.  Ibid.  The remaining amount is “uncompensated
care,” which totaled approximately $43 billion in 2008 and raised the annual
insurance premiums paid by families by an average of $1000.  Ibid.
Even in households at or above the median income, people without insurance
pay for, on average, less than half the cost of the health care they consume.  Herring,
The Effect of the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for
Private Health Insurance, 24 J. Health Econ. 225, 229-31 (2005).  And, in such
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households, uninsured people who consume more than $10,000 in medical services
pay only 22% of the cost.  Id. at 230.
Millions of uninsured people are hospitalized each year, and nearly 60% of
these hospitalizations of the uninsured result in bills greater than $10,000.  ASPE
Research Br. 5.  About one-third result in bills in excess of $20,000, and more than
a quarter result in bills greater than $25,000.  Id. at 5.  In families with income above
400% of the federal poverty level — nearly $90,000 for a family of four — people
without insurance pay in full for only 37% of their hospitalizations.  Id. at 1.  Even
uninsured families at the 90th percentile of savings can afford to pay in full for only
half of the hospitalizations they incur, and these bills account for just 14% of the total
amount that hospitals bill the uninsured.  Id. at 6.
2.  Established Commerce Clause precedent leaves no doubt that Congress has
the power to address this economic problem.  In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), and, more recently, in Raich, the Supreme Court found there was a rational
basis for Congress to have concluded that leaving home-grown and home-consumed
commodities (wheat and marijuana respectively) outside of a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme would affect the price and market conditions for those
commodities.  “In both cases,” the Court explained, “the regulation is squarely within
Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home
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consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand
in the national market for that commodity.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.  
Given that this level of effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to justify
congressional exercise of the commerce authority, there is no doubt that the
regulation at issue here satisfies the “substantial effects” standard.  “Faced with $43
billion in uncompensated care, Congress reasonably could require all covered
individuals to pay for health care now so that money would be available later to pay
for all care as the need arises.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *24 (Sutton, J.)
(emphasis in original); see also id. at *11-*12 (Martin, J.).
For purposes of the commerce power, it is irrelevant that some uninsured
individuals may not generate uncompensated costs in a particular month or year.  Id.
at *31 (Sutton, J.).  The Supreme Court has never required Congress “to legislate with
scientific exactitude,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, and Congress is not required to predict,
person-by-person, who among the uninsured will receive uncompensated health care
services in a given period of time.  Where “Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’
of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971)). 
See also Monson v. DEA, 589 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The question is not
whether Congress could have decided to regulate a narrower class of economic
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activity than it chose to regulate.  Rather, the question is whether Congress had any
rational basis to conclude that the economic activity it chose to regulate ...
substantially affects interstate commerce.”) (emphasis in original).
Here, Congress found that people who “forego health insurance coverage and
attempt to self-insure” often fail, with corresponding “financial risks to households
and medical providers.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  “Given the extremely high
costs of health care for all but the most routine treatments and procedures, the cost of
medical care is beyond the means of all but the most wealthy Americans.”  Economic
Scholars Br. 4; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (legislative finding that 62%
of personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses).  People without
insurance actively participate in the health care services market, and, as a class, fail
to pay for 63% of the services they receive.  Congress thus had far more than a
rational basis to conclude that attempts to “self-insure” pose “a threat to a national
market.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
B. The minimum coverage provision is essential to the Act’s broader
economic regulation of insurance through its guaranteed-issue and
community-rating reforms, which prohibit insurers from relying on
medical condition or history to deny coverage or set premiums.
1.  The minimum coverage provision is also valid Commerce Clause legislation
because it is integral to broader economic regulation — the requirement that insurers
extend coverage and set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical conditions
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or history.  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *12-14 (Martin, J.).  There is no
dispute that these insurance regulations are valid exercises of Congress’s commerce
power.  Pl. Br. 54; see also United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance business is interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause).  Where, as here, “Congress has the authority to enact a regulation
of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation
effective.’” Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981); United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir.
2009).
Congress found, based on the experience of state regulators, that the Act’s
guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements would be unsustainable if
participants in the health care market could postpone purchasing insurance until an
acute need arose.  Congress thus concluded that the absence of a minimum coverage
requirement “would leave a gaping hole” in that regulatory scheme.  Raich, 545 U.S.
at 22.  Thus, the minimum coverage provision forms “an essential part of a broader
economic regulatory scheme.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *15 (Martin, J.).
The Nation has faced a serious shortage of affordable health insurance.  More
than 50 million non-elderly Americans went without insurance in 2009.  Census Rep.,
33
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 49      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
at 23 table 8.  Rising premiums have priced many out of the market.  Between 1999
and 2010, for example, average premiums for employer-sponsored family coverage
increased 138 percent.  Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Benefits, 2010
Annual Survey, at 31, table 1.11 (2010).
Many in the individual market are excluded from coverage by “medical
underwriting,” a process by which insurers establish eligibility and premiums based
on individual health status or history.  Depending on the definition used, between 50
and 129 million non-elderly Americans (19% to 50% of the non-elderly population)
have at least one pre-existing condition, and the four largest for-profit insurers
excluded more than 600,000 individuals from coverage because of such conditions
in the three years before the Affordable Care Act.  HHS, At Risk: Pre-Existing
Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans (2011); Chairman Henry A. Waxman and
Rep. Bart Stupak, Memorandum on Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Conditions in
the Individual Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, at 1
(Oct. 12, 2010); see also Help on the Horizon, at xi (finding, during a three-year
period, about 35% of non-elderly adults in the individual market were denied
coverage, charged higher premiums, or offered limited coverage because of pre-
existing conditions). 
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Insurers often deny coverage for even minor pre-existing conditions, including
“conditions as common as asthma, ear infections, and high blood pressure.”  47
Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Hall).  “The four largest for-profit health
insurance companies ... have each listed pregnancy as a medical condition that would
result in an automatic denial of individual health insurance coverage.”  Chairman
Waxman and Rep. Stupak, Memorandum on Maternity Coverage in the Individual
Health Insurance Market to H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2010).
The Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements will end these
restrictive underwriting practices.  Congress found that these requirements would not
work without a minimum coverage provision to prevent health care consumers from
taking advantage of the new protections by waiting until they are injured or sick to
buy insurance.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  Congress thus found the provision
“essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health
insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of
pre-existing conditions can be sold.”  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
The legislative record demonstrated that the absence of a minimum coverage
requirement linked to guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements had
undermined health care reform efforts in several states.  For example, citing New
Jersey’s experience, Princeton University Professor Uwe Reinhardt explained that
35
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 51      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
“[i]t is well known that community-rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with
voluntary insurance, tends to lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”  Making
Health Care Work for American Families, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong., Prepared Testimony, at 11 (Mar.
17, 2009).  In the wake of similar legislation in New York, “[t]here was a dramatic
exodus of indemnity insurers from New York’s individual market.”  Hall, An
Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. Health Politics, Pol’y & Law 71, 91-92
(2000).  And, when Maine enacted similar legislation, most insurers withdrew from
the state.  Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 117 (2009) (Phil Caper, M.D.,
and Joe Lendvai).  In contrast, Congress found that Massachusetts avoided these
perils by enacting a minimum coverage requirement as part of broader insurance
reforms.  That requirement “has strengthened private employer-based coverage:
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based
coverage has actually increased.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D).  
2.  Plaintiffs assert that “the uninsured — those not buying medical insurance
— do not undercut Congress’s regulation of participants in the insurance market.” 
Pl. Br. 62.  Plaintiffs ignore the contrary evidence before Congress, and fail to
recognize that, for many people, the question is not whether to obtain insurance but
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when to obtain it.  Substantial numbers move in or out of insurance coverage each
year.  CBO, How Many People Lack Health Insurance and for How Long? at 4, 9
(2003).  Moreover, as a general matter, “young adults move into coverage as they
grow older.”  Glied & Stabile, Generation Vexed: Age-Cohort Differences in
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage, 20 Health Affairs 184, 189 (2001);
see also Census Rep., at 23 table 8 (showing that, in 2009, about 30% of individuals
ages 18 to 34 lacked coverage, compared with about 16% of those ages 45 to 64).
It may seem rational to some healthy, young individuals to postpone joining the
insurance pool — as long as insurance remains available at a later date.  Many find,
however, that changes in their medical condition render insurance unavailable later. 
Even a temporary condition as common as pregnancy can result in an automatic
denial of individual health insurance coverage.  See p. 35, supra.  Thus, although
plaintiff Hill is not now pregnant, JA 195 ¶ 10, if she were to become pregnant she
could find it difficult if not impossible to obtain insurance on the individual market
in the absence of the Affordable Care Act’s reforms.  And, when people without
insurance develop significant medical needs, they resort to the “backstop” of
uncompensated care funded by third parties.  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *12.
The Affordable Care Act breaks this cycle by making all individuals insurable
at non-discriminatory rates.  Those without insurance benefit from the guaranteed-
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issue and community-rating requirements, which allow them to obtain and maintain
insurance even when they develop significant medical needs.  At the same time, the
minimum coverage provision ensures “that all Americans who can afford it contribute
to the costs of their own health care by maintaining reasonable insurance coverage.” 
Economic Scholars Br. 5.  Accordingly, the Act’s provisions work in tandem to
reduce cost-shifting by the uninsured and to reform dysfunctional markets in which
people who need medical care cannot get insurance.
C. The minimum coverage provision is a necessary and proper means
of regulating interstate commerce. 
1. The minimum coverage provision is plainly adapted to the
conditions of the health care market.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that people who attempt to “self-insure” often fail, and
collectively shift billions of dollars of costs to other participants in the health care
market.  Instead, plaintiffs take issue with the means that Congress chose to ensure
that participants in the health care market pay for the services they obtain.  Although
plaintiffs do not question Congress’s power to require that people have insurance at
the “point of sale” of health care services, Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *30
(Sutton, J.), they object to the timing of the insurance requirement, which, they
contend, cannot be imposed before medical care is consumed.  Pl. Br. 59.
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Governing precedent does not permit a court to override Congress’s judgment
about the appropriate means to achieve objectives that are within the scope of its
commerce power.  The “relevant inquiry” under the Necessary and Proper Clause “is
simply ‘whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to the attainment of a
legitimate end under the commerce power’ or under other powers that the
Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at
1957 (quoting Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941))); accord Howell, 552 F.3d at 714;
United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 502 (8th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has long rejected the contention that the commerce power
cannot be exercised until after the harm to commerce takes place.  “It cannot be
maintained that the exertion of federal power must await the disruption of ...
commerce.”  Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938).  To the
contrary, Congress may adopt “reasonable preventive measures” to avoid disruptions
to interstate commerce before they occur.  Ibid.
The minimum coverage provision is just such a “reasonable preventive
measure.”  It is reasonably adapted to the practical and moral imperatives of the
health care market, which require that insurance be obtained before the need for
health care is imminent.  The minimum coverage provision ensures that non-
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exempted individuals who can afford insurance will pay for the health care services
they consume, rather than shift their risks and costs to others.  
It is hardly novel for the government to require the purchase of insurance to
prevent the externalization of costs.  In the case of motor vehicle insurance, for
example, the requirement may accompany registration or use of a vehicle.  See, e.g.,
49 U.S.C. § 13906(a).  By contrast, the risks addressed by health insurance are always
present.  “That is why most Americans manage the risk of not having the assets to pay
for health care by purchasing medical insurance.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039,
*24 (Sutton, J.) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D)).  “Requiring insurance today
and requiring it at a future point of sale amount to policy differences in degree, not
kind, and not the sort of policy differences removed from the political branches by the
word ‘proper’ or for that matter ‘necessary’ or ‘regulate’ or ‘commerce.’”  Id. at *30. 
In enacting the minimum coverage provision, Congress understood that a
“health insurance market could never survive or even form if people could buy their
insurance on the way to the hospital.”  47 Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52
(Hall).  Moreover, our society has long recognized that it would be unconscionable
to deny medical care to someone in an emergency because he failed to carry
insurance.  Well before the enactment of the federal Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act in 1986, state court rulings had imposed “a common law duty on
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doctors and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care.”  H.R. Rep. No.
99-241(III) (1985), at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 727.  The modern rule
“is that liability on the part of a private hospital may be based upon the refusal of
service to a patient in a case of unmistakable medical emergency.”  Walling v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 455 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Valdez v.
Lyman-Roberts Hosp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. App. 1982); 35 A.L.R. 3d
841, § 4, at 846-47).  In addition, longstanding common law restricts a physician’s
ability to terminate an existing physician-patient relationship.  See, e.g., 57 A.L.R. 2d
432, § 22[a] (1958); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 210-13 (Utah 1937) (holding a
physician subject to liability for refusing to continue treatment until the patient’s
outstanding account balance was paid).5
By 1985, “at least 22 states [had] enacted statutes or issued regulations
requiring the provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency situation
exists,” which added to “state court rulings impos[ing] a common law duty on doctors
and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care.”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(III)
(1985), at 5.  Finding these measures inadequate to prevent “hospital emergency
 See also Woodfolk v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 644 A.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C.5
1994) (“Generally, the patient’s inability or failure to pay does not justify unilateral
abandonment by the physician.”); Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235, 1236-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (“[O]nce a physician enters into a professional relationship with a patient,
he is not at liberty to terminate that relationship at will.”).
41
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 57      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
rooms [from] refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the
patient does not have medical insurance,” H.R. Rep. No. 99-241(I), at 27, Congress
augmented state law through EMTALA in 1986.  The federal statute requires all
hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency services to stabilize any
patient who arrives with an emergency condition, without regard to ability to pay. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; see also Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249 (1999);
Summers v. Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (8th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).  In devising its legislation, it was clearly “proper” for Congress
to take into account this societal judgment — reflected in state and federal law — that
denying emergency care because a patient lacks insurance would be unconscionable. 
Cf. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1961 (noting the “common law” duty not to release
dangerous persons in one’s custody, in finding it “necessary and proper” for Congress
to confine a federal prisoner whose mental illness threatens others).  Indeed, that
judgment is reflected in the laws of the very states that are plaintiffs’ amici here.   6
There is no doubt that the commerce power would permit Congress to require
insurance at the time that health care services are needed.  Under such a scheme,
 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.1041(3)(k)(1); Tex. Health & Safety Code6
Ann. § 311.022(a), (b); South Carolina Code Ann. § 44-7-260(E); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:2113.4(A); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-1391b; Wash. Rev. Code § 70.170.060(2);
Utah Code Ann. § 26-8a-501(1).
42
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 58      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
however, the penalty for not obtaining coverage — denial of access to medical care
— would be far more draconian and coercive than the tax penalty that Congress
enacted.  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *30 (Sutton, J.).  In any event, even
assuming that plaintiffs could identify a preferable regulatory alternative, that would
provide no basis to invalidate the statute that Congress enacted.
2. Congress can regulate participants in the health care market
even if they are not currently “active” in the insurance market.
The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the premise of plaintiffs’ challenge to the
minimum coverage provision, which is that the provision regulates “inactivity.” 
People without insurance are not “inactive”; they actively participate in the market
for health care services and shift substantial costs to other market participants. 
Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *11-12, 14-15 (Martin, J.); id. at *24, 28-29
(Sutton, J.).  The minimum coverage provision regulates the way participants in the
health care market finance their health care services — activity that is itself
“commercial and economic in nature.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  
As Judge Sutton explained, “[n]o one is inactive when deciding how to pay for
health care, as self-insurance and private insurance are two forms of action for
addressing the same risk.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *29.  Indeed, “[i]f done
responsibly, the former requires more action (affirmatively saving money on a regular
basis and managing the assets over time) than the latter (writing a check once or twice
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a year or never writing one at all if the employer withholds the premiums).”  Id. at
*28.
Plaintiffs treat the minimum coverage requirement as if it were an end in itself
that functioned only in the insurance market.  Congress, however, viewed the
requirement as a means of regulating payment for services in the health care market. 
That congressional judgment was not merely reasonable; it was correct.  Health
insurance is not bought for its own sake; it is bought to pay for health care expenses. 
Porat, et al., Market Insurance Versus Self Insurance, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 657 (1991);
Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 251,
253 (1973) (“Health insurance is purchased not as a final consumption good but as
a means of paying for the future stochastic purchases of health services.”).
Those who resort to other options to pay medical expenses may attempt to “use
informal risk-sharing arrangements, diversify assets, draw down savings, sell assets,
borrow, or go into debt to cover needed services.”  Ruger, The Moral Foundations
of Health Insurance, 100 Q.J. Med. 53, 55 (2007); see also Pauly, Risks and Benefits
in Health Care: The View From Economics, 26 Health Affairs 653, 658 (2007). 
“Regardless of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the
backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice
regarding the method of payment for the health care services one expects to receive.” 
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Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010), appeal
pending, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir.).  Some individuals may prefer to attempt to pay for
health care services out-of-pocket rather than through insurance.  But such economic
conduct is plainly subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.  
Although plaintiffs would divorce the insurance market from the health care
market that it finances, the Supreme Court has long rejected such “formalistic”
distinctions between categories of economic conduct in favor of “broad principles of
economic practicality.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569, 571 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  “[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be
decided by reference to any formula” without regard to “the actual effects of the
activity in question upon interstate commerce.”  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120; see also
Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (“[C]ommerce among the States
is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of
business.”);  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962)
(Congress in the Clayton Act “prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the
definition of the relevant market”); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389,
414-15 (1914) (observing that insurance is “essentially different from ordinary
commercial transactions”).
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As Judge Sutton explained, plaintiffs’ “action/inaction dichotomy” is neither
workable nor consistent with Commerce Clause doctrine.  Thomas More, 2011 WL
2556039, *28.  “The power to regulate includes the power to prescribe and
proscribe.”  Ibid. (citing Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 359-60 (1903)).  “Legislative
prescriptions set forth rules of conduct, some of which require action.”  Ibid.  Such
requirements have never been held to present a problem under the commerce power. 
In United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 713-17 (8th Cir. 2009), for example, this
Court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal statute that requires sex
offenders to register.  In United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 486 (6th Cir. 2001)
(en banc), the Sixth Circuit upheld a federal statute that requires payment of child
support, declaring it “immaterial” that the statute “regulates a defendant's failure to
put a thing in commerce.”  Similarly, the federal drug possession law upheld in Raich
“amounts to forced inaction in some settings (those who do not have drugs must not
get them), and forced action in other settings (those who have drugs must get rid of
them).”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *28 (Sutton, J.).  The federal child
pornography statute likewise requires innocent recipients of child pornography to
destroy the depictions or report the matter to a law enforcement agency.  18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(c).  
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In Raich and Wickard, the Supreme Court rejected “a variation on the
action/inaction line — between regulating individuals already in markets and those
outside of them.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *30 (Sutton, J.).  In Raich, the
Court upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act to the possession of
marijuana grown at home for personal use.  The Court found it irrelevant that the
individuals did not buy, sell, or distribute any portion of the marijuana they
possessed.  And, in Wickard, the Court upheld the federal regulation of wheat that
was not “sold or intended to be sold.”  317 U.S. at 119.
In any event, even on its own terms, plaintiffs’ “action/inaction” dichotomy
would not support this pre-enforcement facial challenge to the minimum coverage
provision, because it would not show that “‘no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.’”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *23 (Sutton, J.)
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004).  Plaintiffs’ “inactivity” theory encompasses only
individuals who have no insurance.  Pl. Br. 54.  Their theory has no application to
individuals who have insurance but object to maintaining it, such as Thomas More
plaintiff DeMars.  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *28.  It has no application to
individuals living in states that require individuals to have insurance.  Id. at *29.  And
it has no application to individuals with insurance that does not meet minimum
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standards.  Thus, on its own terms, plaintiffs’ “activity/inactivity dichotomy does not
work with respect to health insurance in many settings, if any of them.”  Id. at *32.
D. The minimum coverage provision bears no resemblance to the
statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison or to plaintiffs’ hypothetical
directives.
1.  Although plaintiffs seek support for their position from Lopez and
Morrison, those cases held that Congress may not “regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).  In Lopez, the
Court struck down a ban on possession of handguns in school zones.  In Morrison,
the Court invalidated a tort cause of action for gender-motivated violence.  Neither
measure played any role in broader regulation of economic activity, and the
“noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central” to the Court’s
rulings.  Id. at 610; Sabri, 541 U.S. at 607.
“Health care and the means of paying for it are ‘quintessentially economic’ in
a way that possessing guns near schools ... and domestic violence ... are not.” 
Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *25 (Sutton, J).  “No one must ‘pile inference
upon inference,’ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, to recognize that the national regulation of
a $2.5 trillion industry, much of which is financed through ‘health insurance ... sold
by national or regional health insurance companies,’ 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(B), is
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economic in nature.”  Ibid.  Providers and insurers are joined in national networks;
providers serve out-of-state patients, e.g., Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.,
313 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); and insurance companies are characterized by
“[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all the states in
which they operate.”  South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 541.
2.  Rather than address the pertinent features of the statute before the Court,
plaintiffs attack a variety of far-fetched hypothetical statutes that bear no resemblance
to the minimum coverage provision.  Plaintiffs purport to see no difference between
a requirement to maintain insurance to pay for health care costs and a requirement to 
buy an automobile, open a bank account, or buy a home.  Pl. Br. 58-59.
As an initial matter, the far-fetched nature of plaintiffs’ hypotheticals only
underscores the fact that “health care is different.”  Stuart M. Butler, The Heritage
Lectures 218: Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, at 6 (Heritage
Foundation 1989).  “If a young man wrecks his Porsche and has not had the foresight
to obtain insurance, we may commiserate but society feels no obligation to repair his
car.”  Ibid.  By contrast, “[i]f a man is struck down by a heart attack in the street,
Americans will care for him whether or not he has insurance.”  Ibid.  “If we find that
he has spent money on other things rather than insurance, we may be angry but we
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will not deny him services — even if that means more prudent citizens end up paying
the tab.”  Ibid.
Moreover, plaintiffs confuse directives to make a particular purchase with the
minimum coverage provision, which regulates the way health care services are
financed.  There is no doubt that Congress can regulate the way people pay for
products and services in interstate markets.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e) (provision
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that regulates
the terms of mortgage financing).
Although plaintiffs use the rhetoric of liberty, they do not and cannot contend
that the minimum coverage provision violates any “substantive due process” right. 
Such a claim “would have found Constitutional support in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in the years prior to the New Deal legislation of the mid-1930’s, when the
Due Process Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties,” but the
Lochner-era doctrine “has long since been discarded.”  Florida v. HHS, 716 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1161 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
There is no doubt that constraints on federal power play a role in safeguarding
individual rights.  But, stripped of rhetorical excess, the practical right that plaintiffs
seek to vindicate is the ability to consume health care services without insurance and
to pass costs on to other market participants.  There is, of course, no such right in the
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Constitution, and the commerce power vests Congress with ample authority to
prevent such practices and the burdens they impose on interstate commerce.
III.  The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Also Independently 
Authorized by Congress’s Taxing Power. 
A. The minimum coverage provision operates as a tax.
The minimum coverage provision is also independently authorized by
Congress’s power to “lay and collect Taxes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The taxing
power is “comprehensive,” Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581-82
(1937), and “plenary,” Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  In
“passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only with its
practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which
may be applied to it.”  Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363; United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268,
275 (1978) (funds owed by operation of Internal Revenue Code had “essential
character as taxes” despite statutory label as a “penalty”).
The “practical operation” of the minimum coverage provision is as a tax. 
Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363.  The provision amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide
that a non-exempted individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of coverage
shall pay a monthly penalty for so long as he fails to maintain that minimum
coverage.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  The amount of the penalty is calculated as a
percentage of household income for federal income tax purposes, subject to a floor
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and a cap.  Id. § 5000A(c).  The penalty is reported on the individual’s federal income
tax return for the taxable year, and is “assessed and collected in the same manner as”
other specified federal tax penalties.  Id. § 5000A(b)(2), (g).  Individuals who are not
required to file income tax returns for a given year are not required to pay the penalty.
Id. § 5000A(e)(2).  A taxpayer’s responsibility for family members depends on their
status as dependents under the Internal Revenue Code.  Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(3). 
Taxpayers filing a joint tax return are jointly liable for the penalty.  Id.
§ 5000A(b)(3)(B).  And the Treasury Secretary is empowered to enforce the penalty
provision.  Id. § 5000A(g).
It is undisputed that the minimum coverage provision will be “productive of
some revenue.”  Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937).  The CBO
found that it will raise at least $4 billion a year in revenues for the general treasury,
see Letter from CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi,
table 4 (Mar. 20, 2010), and Congress adopted that finding to conclude that the
provision, together with the rest of the Act, will reduce the federal deficit, see Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010).  More recent CBO
projections indicate that the provision will yield $5 billion annually by 2021.  Letter
from Elmendorf to Boehner, table 3.  The provision bears “some reasonable relation”
to the “raising of revenue,” United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919), and
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it is therefore within Congress’s taxing power.  See also Nigro v. United States, 276
U.S. 332, 353 (1928) (any “doubt as to the character” of a tax was removed because
provision raised “substantial” sum of $1 million per year).
B. The provision’s validity under the taxing power does not depend on
how the assessment is labeled.
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s understanding (Thomas More, 2011 WL
2556039, *18), Congress was not required to invoke its taxing power expressly. 
“[T]he constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of
the power which it undertakes to exercise.”  Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948).  Applying the presumption of constitutionality, a court’s task is “to
determine whether Congress had the authority to adopt the legislation, not whether
it correctly guessed the source of that power.”  Usery v. Charleston Co. Sch. Dist.,
558 F. 2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977).
In any event, Congress did invoke its taxing power: the taxing power was
expressly invoked to defeat constitutional points of order against the minimum
coverage provision in the Senate.  155 Cong. Rec. S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 265 (2010).  Moreover, during the legislative
debates, congressional leaders defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing
power.  E.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); id. at
H1824, H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753
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(Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); id. at S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen.
Baucus).
It is not significant that Congress referred to the assessment as a “penalty.” 
Congress used the terms “penalty” and “tax” interchangeably in the Affordable Care
Act, as the Act’s employer responsibility provision shows.  See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 4980H(b)(1), (2), (c)(2)(D), (d)(1) (alternating among the terms “tax,” “assessable
payment,” and “assessable penalty”).  Likewise, the minimum coverage provision’s
legislative history shows that terms like “excise tax” and “penalty” were used
interchangeably in that provision as well.  Compare S. 1796 (Oct. 19, 2009) (Senate
Finance Committee bill) (using term “excise tax”), with S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 52
(Oct. 19, 2009) (Committee Report) (describing it as a “penalty ... accounted for as
an additional amount of Federal tax owed”). 
Far from disclaiming its taxing power, Congress placed the minimum coverage
provision in the Internal Revenue Code; required that the penalty be included on the
taxpayer’s income tax return; and calculated the amount owed as a percentage of
income, subject to a floor and a cap. Thus, the minimum coverage provision is a tax
in both administration and effect.  It is enforced by the Internal Revenue Service and
— in conjunction with the rest of the Act — has been determined by the CBO and
Congress to reduce the budget deficit.  Any doubt as to the meaning of the words in
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the Affordable Care Act should be construed in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. 
Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
C. Congress may impose taxes that also regulate the activity taxed.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the goal of the minimum coverage provision
is not to raise revenue, but to “change individual behavior by requiring all qualified
Americans to obtain medical insurance.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *18.  It
is settled, however, that a tax “does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.”  United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).  “Every tax is in some measure regulatory” in that “it
interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not
taxed.”  Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513.  As long as a statute is “productive of some
revenue,” Congress may exercise its taxing powers irrespective of any “collateral
inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax.”  Id. at 514; id. at 512
(rejecting the argument that a tax on firearms dealers was “not a true tax, but a penalty
imposed for the purpose of suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of firearms”). 
Accordingly, “‘the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral
intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed to
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their accomplishment.’”  Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44-45 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934)) (rejecting challenge to tax on marijuana transfers
that rested “on the regulatory character and prohibitive burden of the section as well
as the penal nature of the imposition”).  The Supreme Court has long “abandoned the
view that bright-line distinctions exist between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.” 
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 743 n.17 (1974).
Congress broke no new ground in using the tax code to shape decision-making
related to health care.  For more than fifty years, federal tax law has pervasively
regulated this area.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 35, 106, 223, 4980D, 9801-34.  Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit recognized that Congress could have “raised taxes on everyone in
an amount equivalent to the current penalty, then offered credits to those with
minimum essential insurance,” or “imposed a lower tax rate on people with health
insurance than those without it.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *17.
There undoubtedly remains a “distinction between taxes and penalties.”  Id. at
*20.  But the distinction does not depend on whether the assessment has a
“regulatory” character, Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 743 n.17; it depends on whether the
assessment is “punitive.”  Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-79
(1994).  The minimum coverage provision has none of the hallmarks of a punitive
sanction.  It does not turn on the taxpayer’s scienter.  Cf. The Child Labor Tax Case,
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259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922).  And, unlike in cases where a “highly exorbitant” tax rate
showed an intent to “punish rather than to tax,” United States v. Constantine, 296
U.S. 287, 294-95 (1935), the penalty under the minimum coverage provision can be
no greater than the cost of qualifying insurance, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(1)(B).  Cf.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45 (“rational foundation” for tax rate showed it was not a
punitive sanction in disguise).  Moreover, the penalty is calculated on a month-by-
month basis, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(1), and payment of the penalty relieves the
taxpayer of the obligation to purchase insurance for that month, in contrast with
instances in which an individual who violates a statute must pay a penalty and is still
required to satisfy the underlying obligation.  See United States v. Reorganized CF&I
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1996).  Thus, the minimum
coverage provision is not a punitive measure.
Nor is the assessment a “direct tax” subject to the Constitution’s apportionment
requirement.  Pl. Br. 64-65.  A direct tax is one imposed “simply, without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance.”  Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171,
175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 444-46 (1868)
(adopting Justice Chase’s definition); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 544 (1869). 
The minimum coverage provision does not impose a flat tax without regard to the
taxpayer’s circumstances.  It is imposed based on whether a taxpayer maintains
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minimum coverage and it is calculated monthly, based on the taxpayer’s household
income.  Id. § 5000A(a), (b)(1).  It thus resembles other federal taxes imposed for
failures to make specified economic arrangements.7
 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4974 (tax on failure of retirement plans to distribute7
assets); id. § 4980B (tax on failure of group health plan to extend coverage to
beneficiary); id. § 4980E (tax on failure of employer to make comparable Archer
MSA contributions); id. § 4942 (tax on failure of private foundation to distribute
income).  
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
 TONY WEST
     Assistant Attorney General
   RICHARD G. CALLAHAN
  United States Attorney
BETH S. BRINKMANN
  Deputy Assistant Attorney General
MARK B. STERN
   ALISA B. KLEIN
   DANA L. KAERSVANG
            (202) 514-5089
      Attorneys, Appellate Staff
            Civil Division, Room 7531
      U.S. Department of Justice 
                     950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
            Washington, D.C. 20530
AUGUST 2011
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 75      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) and (C), I certify
that this brief complies with the type-face and volume limitations set forth in Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) as follows: the type face is fourteen-point
Times New Roman font, and the number of words is 13,344 (excluding the cover,
tables, and certificates).
/s/ Dana Kaersvang
DANA KAERSVANG
Counsel for Appellees
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 76      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
CERTIFICATE OF VIRUS CHECK
A virus check was performed on the electronic version of this brief using
“Microsoft Forefront Client Security” definition 1.109.1459.0, and no virus was
detected. 
/s/ Dana Kaersvang
DANA KAERSVANG
Counsel for Appellees
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 77      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of August, 2011, I filed an electronic copy
of the foregoing brief through this Court’s appellate CM/ECF system.  The following
participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the
CM/ECF system:
Mark F. Hearne, II
Lindsay S.C. Brinton
Arent & Fox
112 S. Hanley Road, Suite 200
St. Louis, MO 63105-3418
Steven A. Haskins
Robert C. O'Brien
Arent & Fox
555 W. Fifth Street, 48th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90013
/s/ Dana Kaersvang
DANA KAERSVANG
Counsel for Appellees
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 78      Date Filed: 08/12/2011 Entry ID: 3817614
